Abstract. Group Password-Based Authenticated Key Exchange (GPAKE) allows a group of users to establish a secret key, as long as all of them share the same password. However, in existing GPAKE protocols as soon as one user runs the protocol with a non-matching password, all the others abort and no key is established. In this paper we seek for a more flexible, yet secure, GPAKE and put forward the notion of partitioned GPAKE. Partitioned GPAKE tolerates users that run the protocol on different passwords. Through a protocol run, any subgroup of users that indeed share a password, establish a session key, factoring out the "noise" of inputs by users holding different passwords. At the same time any two keys, each established by a different subgroup of users, are pair-wise independent if the corresponding subgroups hold different passwords. We also introduce the notion of password-privacy for partitioned GPAKE, which is a kind of affiliation hiding property, ensuring that an adversary should not be able to tell whether any given set of users share a password. Finally, we propose an efficient instantiation of partitioned GPAKE building on an unforgeable symmetric encryption scheme and a PAKE by Bellare et al. [6] . Our proposal is proven secure in the random oracle/ideal cipher model, and requires only two communication rounds.
Introduction
Password Authenticated Key Exchange (PAKE) [6, 10] allows two parties sharing a (short, low-entropy) password to agree on a session key, even in presence of active adversaries. Group PAKE (GPAKE) is the natural extension to PAKE that empowers groups of more than two users to establish a session key, given that they share a common password. Constant-round GPAKE protocols exist in both the standard (e.g., [2] ) and the random oracle model (e.g., [3] ).
To the best of our knowledge, no GPAKE protocol tolerates users holding different passwords. That is, prior to engaging in a GPAKE protocol, users must identify the purported group members claiming to hold the password. The GPAKE protocol, then, allows to prove knowledge of the password (and to establish a session key). However, if just one user engages in a protocol execution with a different password, she is regarded as an active adversary and causes the users to abort (even if all other users do share the same password). The same principle is actually applied in (non-password) group key exchange protocols [23] ; whenever authentication fails, users typically abort the protocol execution and no joint key is established among those who successfully authenticate each others.
In this paper, we pursue a more flexible design for group key exchange, where robustness with respect to authentication failures is provided. Focusing on the password scenario, we consider a setting in which users are not aware in advance of who else in the group of participants may actually share a password with them. When the protocol is over, any subset of users that indeed share a password, establish a session key (with corresponding correct partner identifier -pid -and session identifier -sid), factoring out the "noise" of inputs by users holding different passwords. Passwords, therefore, induce a partition on the set of users.
Once the protocol is over, users in each subset of this partition obtain a shared secret key, whereas keys established by different subsets are pair-wise independent. 4 By definition, an execution of partitioned GPAKE does not "abort" when it involves parties with a different password. Rather, it factors out messages by those parties and allows to compute a shared key among users who do share a password. We remark that the lack of abort does not weaken the security against online attacks. In both our protocols and a traditional GPAKE with aborts, a user can indeed tell if some parties have input a different password by checking if they have been included in the partner identifier. Therefore, as in the case of aborts, it is up to the specific application scenario to decide whether the other party should be granted another attempt.
Partitioned GPAKE finds natural application in ad-hoc scenarios. For example, in an Internet-of-Things (IoT) swarm, devices belonging to the same user may need to establish a shared key (assuming that all devices of a given user have been initialized with the same password). Moreover, in a multi-user scenario, different IoT swarms belonging to different users will co-exist and key establishment in one swarm should not affect the others.
Also, partitioned GPAKE may surprisingly be used in scenarios where sharing a password is not desirable. For example, password reuse across accounts is considered bad practice because of the consequences that a security breach at a service provider may have for others. By using partitioned GPAKE several service providers may identify those individuals who re-use the same password across accounts. Of course, this usage of partitioned GPAKE is only possible when servers actually store the passwords for authentication (or a deterministic function of them).
Related work. Our goal is to accomplish secure and efficient designs for GPAKE which are in addition resilient to authentication failures. With a similar (yet more general) motivation, a notion of robustness has been defined for group key establishment protocols: a key establishment protocol is defined as robust if it runs to completion even if some players "fail" during a protocol execution [4, 11, 17, 19, 24] . At this, failures are generic and not necessarily linked to authentication, which is our main concern here. Rather, they reflect the situation in which one of the involved participants actually disappears before completing all interaction phases described in the protocol specification. Many of these proposals are inefficient, while others make strong assumptions on the failure probabilities of users, on the existence of synchronization measures or on the communication network itself. The most efficient ones [24, 19] actually assume to have at hand reliable and authenticated broadcast channels.
GPAKE protocols, including our work, share some similarities with Affiliation-Hiding Authenticated Key Exchange (AH-AKE) [18, 25] protocols. AH-AKE allows users affiliated with the same authority (i.e., holding a credential issued by that authority) to establish a secret key, without disclosing their affiliation to eavesdroppers or users holding non-matching credentials. Some AH-AKE are realized using pseudonyms and are often linkable, i.e., the involvement of a given user can be recognized across multiple sessions [5, 12, 18 ], yet there are also unlinkable AH-AKE [20] . Affiliation-Hiding Authenticated Group Key Agreement protocols (AH-GAKE) [16, 17, 26] are the natural extension of AH-AKE to the multiparty setting. These proposals call for some heavy infrastructure involving authorities and publicly available revocation lists. In contrast, GPAKE focuses on a simpler and somewhat more realistic scenario where users simply hold passwords, rather than credentials, and there is no revocation. 5 We note that the affiliation hiding property of AH-GAKE prevents an adversary from telling whether two users share an affiliation. In our setting, affiliation is password-defined, and borrowing from AH we define password-privacy (see Section 2.3) that strengthens the privacy provisions of partitioned GPAKE protocols.
Contributions. We introduce here the new notion of partitioned GPAKE, aiming at designs suited for scenarios where the specific group of users sharing a password is not known a priori. We thus augment the correctness requirements from standard GPAKE, while the usual key-secrecy guarantees must also be attained. Further, we define password-privacy as a kind of affiliation-hiding property. Once the security model under consideration has been made explicit in Section 2, we give in Section 3 a design of a partitioned GPAKE building on an unforgeable symmetric encryption scheme and a PAKE by Bellare et al. [6] . We further prove it attains key secrecy and password-privacy in the ideal cipher/random oracle model. Our proposal is simple and efficient, as it requires only two rounds and, during the first one, each participant essentially broadcasts the (ideal-cipher) encryption of a single group element, regardless of the number of users engaged in the protocol execution. Our main efficiency advantage comes from the fact that users must not run a preliminary phase in order to recognize their partners on the actual GPAKE. In the concluding section, we further comment on possible variants of our design that may be proven secure without idealized assumptions, at the price of losing efficiency.
Security Model and Security Goals
Similar to previous work, we assume a public password dictionary D ⊆ {0, 1}
* to be efficiently recognizable and of constant or polynomial size. In particular, we assume that a polynomially bounded adversary is able to enumerate D. The set S = {U 1 , . . . , U N } of users is partitioned in l ≥ 2 disjoint subsets, such that
For the sake of simplicity, we assume all passwords are chosen uniformly at random from D, and are represented by bitstrings of the same size (denoted by k).
Communication Model and Adversarial Capabilities
Protocol instances. Users are modeled as probabilistic polynomial time (ppt) Turing machines. Each user U ∈ S may execute a polynomial number of protocol instances in parallel and we use Π j i to refer to the j-th instance of user i, which can be considered as a process executed by U i . To each instance we assign seven variables:
-used j i indicates whether this instance is being or has been used for a protocol run; -state For more details on the usage of the variables we refer to the work of Bellare et al. in [6] .
Communication network. Arbitrary point-to-point connections among the users are assumed to be available. The network is, however, non-private and fully asynchronous. More specifically, it is controlled by the adversary, who may delay, insert and delete messages at will.
Adversarial capabilities. We restrict to probabilistic polynomial time (ppt) adversaries. The capabilities of an adversary A are made explicit through a number of oracles allowing A to communicate with protocol instances run by the users:
-Send(U i , j, M ). Sends message M to the instance Π j i of U i and returns the reply generated by this instance. If A queries this oracle with an unused instance Π j i and M being the set of users {U i1 , . . . , U iµ } ⊆ S, engaging in the protocol (including U i ), then the flag used j i is set, and the first protocol message of Π j i for initializing a protocol run involving {U i1 , . . . , U iµ } is returned.
Executes a complete protocol run among the specified unused instances of the respective users. The adversary obtains a transcript of all messages sent over the network. A query to the Execute oracle is supposed to reflect passive eavesdropping. In particular, no password online-guess can be implemented with this oracle.
-Reveal(U i , j). Yields the session key sk j i (if this has been defined).
-Test(U i , j). Only one query of this form is allowed for an active adversary A. Provided that sk j i is defined, (i. e. acc j i = true and sk j i = null), A can issue this query at any time when being activated. Then with probability 1/2 the session key sk j i and with probability 1/2 a uniformly chosen random session key is returned.
-Corrupt(U i ). Returns the password pw i held by U i .
Correctness and Key Secrecy
Correctness. Our definition of correctness extends the standard one in GPAKE. Namely, without active adversarial interference, it should be the case that users holding matching passwords end up establishing a common session key as intended and assigning the same name (sid) to it. Furthermore, messages from users with non-matching password should not disrupt session key computations.
Definition 1 (Correctness)
. Let D be a dictionary and S be a set of users as described earlier. Then, a partitioned group password-based key establishment protocol P is correct if in the presence of a passive adversary A -i. e., A only uses the Execute oracle-a single execution of the protocol among U i1 , . . . , U iµ involves µ instances Π j1 i1 , . . . , Π jµ iµ and ensures that with overwhelming probability all instances:
-accept, i. e., acc (Note that if U is is the only user in U τ , then she will end up with unique pid js is , sid js is , and sk js is .)
Key Secrecy. Here we define the main security notion of partitioned GPAKE protocols. In order to do so, we introduce the notions of partnering and freshness to express which instances are associated in a common protocol session, and how to rule out trivial attacks, respectively.
Partnering. We adopt the notion of partnering from [9] where instances Π [9] pid lists user instances engaging in a common protocol execution. In our scenario, pid explicits instances that engage in a common protocol execution and share a password. In other words, in [9] and in other GPAKE proposals, a user defines pid at the beginning of the protocol, while in our settings, a user discovers pid at the end of the protocol.
Note that the above notion of partnering defines an equivalence relation on the set of possible instances (namely, it is reflexive, symmetric and transitive). Further, to avoid trivial cases we assume that an instance Π j i always accepts the session key constructed at the end of the corresponding protocol run, if no deviation from the protocol specification occurs. Moreover, without adversarial interference all users in the same protocol session belonging to the same subset U k , i.e., holding the same password, should come up with the same session key, store it under the same session identifier and be aware of whom they share it with.
Freshness. This notion helps specifying under which conditions a Test-query can be executed by the adversary in the security experiment. An instance Π j i is called fresh if the adversary never made one of the following queries:
-Corrupt(U t ) to any U t holding the same password as U i (i.e., so that U i and U t are both in U τ for some τ ∈ {1, . . . , l}); -Reveal(U t , m) with Π j i and Π m t being partnered. The notion of freshness allows to rule out trivial attacks. In particular, revealing a session key from an instance Π j i clearly yields the session key of all instances partnered with Π j i and, therefore, this kind of "attack" is not taken into account for the security definition. Also, note that this definition of freshness implies that corrupting users which hold a different password from the one held by the uses specified in the Test query, should be of no help to the adversary.
Key secrecy. Now that we have introduced the notions of partnering and freshness, we are ready to fully define key secrecy. As typical in password-based protocols, we observe that since the dictionary D has polynomial size we cannot prevent an adversary from correctly guessing a password pw ∈ D used by any of the users. Therefore, our goal is to restrict the adversary A to such online-verification of password guesses.
In the above setting, for a fixed group key establishment protocol P, let Succ( ) be the probability that an adversary A queries Test on a fresh instance Π j i and guesses correctly the bit b used by the Test oracle in a moment when Π j i is still fresh. Now we define A s advantage as the function
We now introduce a function ε to capture the weaknesses that may originate in the employed authentication technique; namely, as the adversary might be able to guess passwords online, ε will explicit a bound on A s probability of guessing a shared password.
Definition 2 (Key-secrecy). Let P be a correct partitioned group password-authenticated key establishment protocol, with D and S as described above. Let A be a probabilistic polynomial time adversary having access to the Execute, Send, Reveal and Corrupt oracles. We say that P provides key secrecy, if for every such A, running in the experiment described in Section 2.1 and querying the Send oracle to at most q instances, the following inequality holds for some negligible function negl and some function ε which is at most linear in its second variable q,
Note that assuming passwords are selected uniformly at random and only a constant number of passwords can be checked by the adversary on each on-line attack, it holds ε( , q) = O q |D| . Remark 1. Typically, in GAKE the Corrupt oracle is used to model different flavours of forward security, i.e., to establish to what extent the leakage of authentication keys compromises the security of previously agreed session keys. In our scenario, however, corrupted users are to be understood as adversaries who might actually be legitimate members of a different password-defined subset U δ . Thus, our model implicitly states that everyone who is not in the same password-defined subset is understood as under adversarial control.
Password privacy
In this section we introduce a security notion for partitioned GPAKE protocols that we call password-privacy. Very intuitively, password-privacy ensures that an active adversary should not gain any information on the passwords used by legitimate users, so he should not even be able to tell whether a given set of users actually share the same password or not unless he has guessed the involved password(s). Basically, if we consider the partition on the set of users induced by the password assignment, then the adversary should not learn information about such partitions beyond what he may get by just making wild guesses.
It is interesting to note that such a notion is not relevant in many GPAKE proposals, as by design messages constructed from a non-matching password are typically recognized as adversarially generated and result in an abort (see for instance [1, 2, 3] ). Indeed, in such scenario an active adversary may learn if two users U i and U t share the same password by starting a new session involving U i and replaying him messages constructed by U t in a different execution. Now, the adversary just observes whether this rouge session is aborted or not. In contrast, in partitioned GPAKE protocols, executions always succeed and at their end every participant ends up with a valid key (even if only participants sharing the same password will share the same session key).
Our notion of password-privacy is rather inspired to that of affiliation hiding [18, 25] considered in authenticated key exchange. Affiliation hiding implies that an active adversary should not be able to obtain any information on group membership through a protocol execution (without considering trivial attacks where the adversary shares the affiliation of the victims). In particular, an adversary should not be able to tell whether two users share the same affiliation or not. In our scenario, this translates into guaranteeing that no active adversary should gain information on which users do share a password, assuming he has not guessed the password used by any/some of them.
We model password-privacy with a kind of indistinguishability game where the adversary A interacts with a challenger. First, he chooses the victim subgroup U ⊆ S and two partitions P 0 and P 1 of it. Then the challenger randomly selects one of the two partitions and assigns passwords (chosen uniformly at random) consistently to the corresponding subgroups. A wins if it can tell which of the two partitions has actually been chosen by the challenger, under the restriction that A cannot query the Reveal or Corrupt oracles on any of the users in U. 7 We stress that in our game we make no assumption about the passwords of all the remaining users in S \ U; these passwords can be even chosen by the adversary (i.e., the adversary can simulate any of these users on its own). This reflects the fact that our definition models the privacy of passwords not known by the adversary.
Definition 3 (Password-privacy). Let P be a correct partitioned GPAKE protocol. Consider a public dictionary D and (potential) set of users S = {U 1 , . . . , U N }, where N is polynomial in the security parameter . Let A be a probabilistic polynomial time adversary interacting with a challenger Ch in the following game:
1. A selects a set of users U ⊆ S, and two partitions P 0 and P 1 of U 2. Ch chooses a bit b ∈ {0, 1} uniformly at random and assigns a password, also chosen uniformly at random from the dictionary, for each subgroup of the partition P b . Further, he follows the specification of P.
3.
A, equipped with Send and Execute, must output a guess b and wins if b = b. 8 We say that P achieves password-privacy if every p.p.t. A wins the above password-privacy game with (at most) negligible probability over a random guess, provided he did not guess any password from a user in U. More precisely, for every p.p.t. let Succ( ) be the probability that an adversary A guesses correctly the bit b selected by Ch. Now we define A s advantage as the function
Let q denote the number of instances to which A has made a Send query. Then a protocol P has passwordprivacy if the following holds for some negligible function negl and some function ε which is at most most linear in q, Adv
Our Construction of Partitioned GPAKE
We propose an instantiation of a partitioned GPAKE that satisfies key secrecy and password-privacy. Our idea builds on the two-party password based key exchange protocol presented by Bellare, Pointcheval and Rogaway in [6] , and is also inspired by an n-party private equality test (PET) protocol by Gelles, Ostrovsky and Winoto (see Protocol 4 of [15] ), which allows a distinguished user (Alice) to detect whether the n − 1 private inputs of her peers are actually equal.
At first glance it may seem that partitioned GPAKE may be achieved by directly combining a PET protocol with a "standard" GPAKE. It is however not clear how to end up with a correct and efficient system in that fashion. Let us first note that assuming |D| > N the number of possible dictionary-induced partitions of S is of size super-exponential in N , 9 thus directly executing a PET protocol to check on every possible partition is simply infeasible. Furthermore, constructions for n-party PET are asymmetric: upon termination a distinguished user (Alice) learns whether or not all private inputs are equal while the other parties learn nothing. Thus, once a group of users sharing the same password is identified via PET subsequent communication would be required so that each user learns who they share a password with before the actual GPAKE starts.
Our approach is easier to understand with a high-level description in two stages: during the first stage, users from S run pair-wise PAKE in such a way that, after the execution, any two users establish a common key, provided they both hold the same password-users holding different passwords will get as output from this stage random independent keys. Let us denote by sk i,t the (first stage) output two-party key that user U i stores as shared with U t . Indeed, if U i and U t hold matching passwords, the corresponding two-party keys will coincide, i.e., sk i,t = sk t,i . Otherwise, sk i,t and sk t,i will be chosen independently at random from a fixed key space. Notice that this first stage can be carried through with the same number of communication rounds as the underlying PAKE. During the second stage, each user picks a random key contribution and sends it to each other user, symmetrically encrypting it with the shared key established before. That is, U i selects a random nonce r i and encrypts it for each t = i using sk i,t . To conclude each user computes the final key by combining the key contributions that she can decrypt (including her own). Note this second stage is completed with one only communication round. 8 We remark here that A does not have the Reveal oracle when confronting the password-privacy game. Indeed, it would trivially allow him to learn whether two users share a password or not (moreover, simply by executing a session involving all users, he would learn through reveal queries the password induced partition in S -for the case S polynomial). 9 It is actually BN , the so-called N -th Bell number. The following recursive formula is satisfied: BN = n k=0 N k B k , see [13] .
The security guarantees of each proposal following the structure depicted above, clearly depends on the concrete choices for the underlying PAKE and symmetric encryption scheme. Indeed, for achieving passwordprivacy the PAKE underlying our proposal should provide assurance that the message flow from the first stage does not leak any information on the initial password-induced partition. Furthermore, we must also require that the second-stage encryptions of (random) values using the same keys are not linkable. In the next section, we describe the specific building blocks that we adopted to build a secure protocol following the above idea. Aiming at an efficient design, we also select a PAKE with the nice feature that each user must only broadcast one message during the first stage. This message enables her to establish an independent two-party key with any other user sharing the same password.
Tools
Bellare, Pointcheval and Rogaway PAKE. Our main building block is the EKE2 PAKE presented by Bellare et al. in [6] which is secure in the so-called ideal cipher model (see [8] ). In this model, it is assumed that there exists a publicly accessible random block cipher with a k-bit key and a n-bit input/output, 10 that is chosen uniformly at random among all block ciphers of this form. Further it is needed to assume that ideal random function exists, namely, we will model a hash function H used in the key derivation process as a random oracle [7] . These two models can actually be proven equivalent, as evidenced in [14] .
Informally, EKE2 can be described as a Diffie-Hellman key exchange where message flows are encrypted using the password as secret key, and the two-party key is the random oracle image of the Diffie-Hellman triplet concatenated with the users names. Further, session identifiers are constructed concatenating the message flow.
Unforgeable encryption. For the choice of our second building block, a symmetric encryption scheme Π, we will select a construction which fulfills a very strong notion of unforgeability; namely, we should not even allow the adversary to produce any new valid ciphertext without the private key. Such property is defined in [22] as existential unforgeability; we adapt Definition 5 from that paper here; Definition 4. Let Π = (KEYGEN, ENC, DEC) be a private-key encryption scheme. Let be the security parameter and A be any pptm algoritm. Define Adv exist A,Π ( ) = P r sk ← KEYGEN(1 ); y ← A : DEC sk (y) =⊥ . At this, y is produced by the adversary A which may use an encryption oracle E sk , yet y must not have been directly returned by E sk . We say that Π is (t, p, b; δ)-secure in the sense of existential unforgeability if for any adversary A which runs in time at most t and asks at most p queries to the encryption oracle, these totaling at most b bits 11 , we have Adv exist A,Π ( ) ≤ δ( ). If δ is negligible in , we will simply say that Π is an unforgeable encryption scheme.
Furthermore, in Theorem 1 of [22] it is proven that unforgeability along with chosen plaintext security implies adaptive chosen ciphertext security. For our generic construction we will make use of a symmetric key encryption scheme Π secure in this sense, thus, we may assume that the adversary will not be able to produce any valid ciphertext, nor to gain any information on the plaintexts underlying encrypted values.
Our construction
Now we are ready to present our concrete construction, which is depicted in Figure 1 . Its main building blocks are: -a hash function H, wich will be modelled as a random oracle; we assume it to range on {0, 1} d , for d polynomial in the security parameter , -a private key encryption scheme Π = (KEYGEN, ENC, DEC), assumed to be secure in the the sense of existential unforgeability and achieving chosen ciphertext security (see [22] and section 4 above). For each choice of the security parameter, we will denote by P and C the corresponding polynomial sized plaintext and ciphertext spaces, and assume P to be an additive group. 12 Furthermore, we will assume KEYGEN selects keys uniformly at random from the range of the random oracle H.
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-an ideal cipher E : D × G −→Ĝ, where D is the password dictionary, G is a cyclic group of order q (polynomial in ) andĜ is a finite set of q elements.
Round 1
Broadcast. Each Ui chooses uniformly at random a value xi ∈ {1, . . . , q − 1} and broadcasts
Computation. For every received message (Ut, Yt), the user Ui sets sidi,t = Ui||Yi||Ut||Yt.
otherwise Ui selects ski,t uniformly at random in the range of H. As a result, for every Ut holding the same password as Ui, user Ui defines a two-party key
and a matching session identifier a .
Round 2:
Broadcast. Each user Ui selects u.a.r. ri ∈ P, and sends, for each t = i,
Computation. For every received message (Ut, sidt,i, ati), user Ui computes cit := DEC sk it (ati) and sets pid = {i} ∪ {t : cit = {ri, ⊥}}. Further, for each t ∈ pid, t = i, it sets r * t := cit and also r * i := ri. Session Key/session identifier definition. User Ui sets acci :=true, derives the (subgroup) key as the addition ski := l∈pid r * l , and also the session identifier
a assuming i < t, i.e., users inputs are displayed ordered in the two party session identifiers. b again, here some prefixed ordering is assumed in order to attain consistency of the sid's. Theorem 1. Let Π = (KEYGEN, ENC, DEC) be a symmetric encryption scheme which is both unforgeable and chosen plaintext semantically-secure. Then, the protocol from Figure 1 is a correct partitioned password based group key agreement achieving key secrecy as defined in Definition 2 and password-privacy as defined in Definition 3 under the computational Diffie-Hellman assumption in group G in the random oracle/ideal cipher model.
Proof.
Correctness. In an honest execution of the protocol, it is easy to verify that all participants in the protocol will terminate by accepting and computing the same session identifier and session key as those who hold the same password.
Key Secrecy. The proof is set up in terms of several experiments or games, where a challenger interacts with the adversary confronting him with a counterfeit Test-challenge in the spirit of Definition 2. From game to game the challenger's behavior somehow deviates from the previous, with the corresponding impact on A's success probability. Following standard notation, we denote by Adv(A, G i ) the advantage of the adversary when confronted with Game i. The security parameter is denoted by .
In the sequel, we denote by q exe the number of Execute calls made by the adversary. Also q will denote the number of instances to which the adversary has made a Send query, thus, it is the number of instances that have suffered on-line attacks. Similarly, q ro will denote the number of queries A makes to the hash function H.
Game 0. This first game corresponds to a real attack, in which all the parameters are chosen as in the actual scheme. By definition, Adv(A, G 0 ) = Adv(A).
Game 1.
We assume that the hash function H is simulated as a Random Oracle. Namely, every time a new query α is asked, the simulator selects u.a.r a value h α from the range of H and stores the pair α, h α in a table (from now on, the H-list). Should the value α be queried again, the simulator will look in the H-list and forward h α as answer.
Furthermore, we explicit here the ideal cipher simulation. For a given password pw, the simulator will maintain an IC pw -list in which for every query (pw, g) he stores a different valueĝ which is selected uniformly at random inĜ.
14 Similarly, he also maintains a list capturing the decryption calls done to the ideal cipher, which we may denote IC Game 2. In this game, we exclude certain collisions of values chosen uniformly at random in different sessions. Namely, this game aborts in case the same exponent in Round 1 or the same random contribution in Round 2 is selected in different sessions by two (non-necessarily distinct) honest users. Similarly we exclude the event that an H-collision occurs at the time of extracting different two-party keys or session identifiers at the end of Round 1 in different protocol executions.
It is not hard to see that the difference between the two games
is bounded by the probability of "partial collisions" on independent transcripts, which is in turn bounded by
where P is the plaintext space for Π, from where the nonces are selected in Round 1.
Game 3. Consider the event that A queries the random oracle on the 5-tuple
such that both the values X i and X t were generated by the simulator during the game and Z = X xi t , (essentially, if A queries the oracle on a valid CDH tuple). If such event (that we call Bad) happens, the simulation is aborted. Clearly, |Adv(A, G 3 ) − Adv(A, G 2 )| ≤ P (Bad).
It is easy to see that for any adversary A that cause the Bad event to happen it is possible to construct another adversary B against the CDH assumption. The reduction is rather straightforward. B, on input g x , g y , chooses a random index q * ← {1, . . . , q exe } and two user indices i, t ← {1, . . . , N } also at random. Then, in the q * -th protocol execution requested by the adversary B sets X i = g x and X t = g y for the users i and t respectively. Finally, in the end of the game, it selects one random entry from H-list such that among the ones with X i = g x and X t = g y , and returns the last value Z of the tuple. Clearly, if the event Bad occurs, and B guessed correctly the indices i, t and q * , then B found a solution for the CDH problem. Otherwise, if any of the guess was wrong, B aborts. It is not hard to see that
where Adv CDH G,g ( ) is the probability that B has of winning a computational Diffie-Hellman challenge over G with generator g.
